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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of universities’ reputation on teaching income, and 
demonstrates how strongly reputation may affect the fees that they can charge. Higher education 
is increasingly competitive and international and institutions are pre-occupied with national and 
international prestige. Research output is demonstrably central to reputation and, specifically, to 
global rankings, but less has been written about the benefits of high prestige for teaching 
income, and the ability to charge high fees. This paper uses English data to show the impact 
when fees are partially deregulated. Public universities with high rankings in global league 
tables and on domestic measures can command teaching income per student which is very much 
higher (in this case typically more than a third) than lower-prestige institutions.  This financial 
return to prestige further increases universities’ incentives to seek high positions in league tables 
and establish a reputational brand. 
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Introduction 
 
In today’s global and knowledge-based economy,  universities play an ever greater role 
both in determining individuals’ labour market success and in generating research than ever 
before.  Tertiary enrolments have soared across all continents; moreover,  very large number of 
students now study outside their countries of origin.  Universities now operate in an 
environment characterised not just by globalisation itself but, as discussed below, by attendant 
changes in stratification systems and growing marketisation. (Altbach and Knight 2007; 
Marginson 2016) 
Funding has changed accordingly. Historically, universities were funded through private 
fees and charitable donations. Later, many governments moved to direct funding of public 
higher education, with no or very low charges to students. Government grants remain central to 
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university funding but for the last quarter-century, governments under budgetary pressure have 
sought to increase private contributions and have re-introduced or raised tuition fees. 
 Reputation and ‘brand’ are central to institutions’ success in the resulting competitive 
environment. (Molesworth, Scullion and Nixon eds, 2011, Blackmore 2016).   The much-
discussed growth in university rankings has had a major impact on reputational dynamics; and 
scholars have argued that higher education is increasingly subject to ‘winner-take-all’  forces, in 
which a few reputational winners receive large benefits (Frank and Cook 1995; Wolf 2002; 
Marginson 2014; Fowles et al 2016).  If so, we can expect that reputational winners may, inter 
alia,  derive direct financial benefits through an ability to charge higher fees.  This article 
contributes novel empirical evidence by examining the relationship between reputation and 
teaching income across an entire national system, England. We ask “Is a university’s teaching 
income directly affected by reputation?’ and examine a number of reputational factors, 
including league tables. The findings have important policy implications. 
 
Stratification and marketisation 
  
Stratification of universities at national level is not new. A university or college education 
is a source of concrete skills and knowledge, but it has always been a ‘positional good’ as well, 
enhancing individuals’ position compared to that of others because it signals general qualities 
and also provides access to high-status networks. In many (though not all) national systems, 
there has been differential status attached to attendance at one university rather than another. In 
positional good terms, it can matter greatly which university someone attended, not merely 
whether they attended university.  (Bourdieu 1998; Yudkevich, Altbach and Rumbley 2016). 
Recently, the university sector has become increasingly globalised, and Marginson argues that, 
as a result, a worldwide system of stratification has emerged with ever-growing effects at local 
and national levels. (Marginson 2016)).  
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The development of a highly stratified university system is strongly linked to the increased 
marketisation of higher education. Marketisation, meaning that market principles become 
increasingly important for both the supply and demand for higher education, is evident in many 
national systems. (Molesworth et al 2011) Developed countries such as the UK or Australia 
have altered governance and financing systems to do this without much  private capital or 
ownership, creating ‘quasi-markets’. Meanwhile, rapid growth of private institutions alongside 
public ones is evident in many middle-income and emerging economies (Bok 2003; Brown 
2011).   
Marketisation, by design and intent, means that universities find themselves in strongly 
competitive environments (Molesworth op cit). One visible effect has been the growth of 
dedicated marketing departments and strategies (Hemsley-Brown and Oplatka 2006). Another is 
the very strong preoccupation of contemporary universities, and their senior officers, with 
reputation. Management scholars see reputation as an ‘intangible resource that enables 
competitive advantage’ (Finch et al 2013: 35) and research confirms the importance of 
reputation in a marketised higher education sector (Bienkowski et al 2012). 
Reputation and brand   
An organisation’s reputation is created by and through the judgement of others: it can thus 
be seen as a ‘collective representation of….past actions’ (Gardberg and Fombrun 2002). 
However, it is not necessarily ordinal: many or all organisations in a given category can have 
the same or similar reputations on particular measures, and reputations can exist at group level. 
Blackmore (op cit) distinguishes it from prestige, which is inherently relative and zero-sum, and 
documents the preoccupation of contemporary university leaders with both.   
Scholars agree that reputation and prestige are critical in attracting many, and good, 
students and good faculty (Fumasoli & Huisman 2013). Universities therefore strive to signal 
that they are highly desirable destinations. They may advertise their alignment with an  
‘institutional template’ characteristic of high-status institutions  (Pizarro Milian 2017); or 
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highlight specific attributes and create a specific ‘brand’ (Chapleo et al 2017). Market 
positioning is now seen as centrally important in the not-for-profit sector, as it has long been in 
the private sector  but there is little empirical research on impact as compared to communication 
strategies (Hemsley-Brown op cit).  
One way for universities to signal their desirability is by their association with certain 
other universities.  The US ‘Ivy League’ group of universities is technically no more than an 
athletics league, but has become a byword for excellence: it plausibly adds to the prestige of 
Dartmouth, if not of Harvard, to belong. In Canada, research has demonstrated that employers 
perceive higher education institutions from different categories as having quite distinct and 
shared characteristics, which, as the authors note, may be an asset for some, and bring higher 
prestige, but a liability for others (Finch et al 2013). 
British universities have formed a number of very clear mission groups, which may also 
function as brands signalling common characteristics.  Filippakou and Tapper (2015: 134) link 
this development to ‘the desire of the universities to seek out more favourable branding images’. 
They also note that, among these groups, only the Russell Group, comprising large research 
universities with selective admissions, has proven highly attractive to would-be members . It is 
also the only one which is widely known outside the sector. 
While reputational factors do not automatically generate individual hierarchies, scholars 
agree that reputation conveys competitive advantage and that position in any global higher 
status hierarchy, of the type identified by Marginson (2016) and Altbach (2004), will be closely 
linked to reputation (Finch op cit, Gardberg and Fombrun op cit). Moreover, the larger and more 
disparate the marketplace in which a university is recruiting, the harder it will be for potential 
students to draw on complex contextualised knowledge about an institution, and the more likely 
they will be to seek generalized, composite indicators. This will be true for national as opposed 
to local and regional contexts, and even more true in a international one. (Rosenzweig 2014; 
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Hazelkorn 2015) The growing influence of global league-table rankings is, we would argue, to 
be understood in this context. 
Country-specific rankings of universities (such as by US News and World Report in the 
USA) have existed in several countries for a good number of years. International ‘league tables’ 
such as those of Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Times Higher Education are quite recent 
(originating in 2003 and 2004, respectively)  but have very quickly come to affect organisational 
behaviour (Marginson 2014; Yudkevich, op cit). Concern over rankings has made the collection 
and analysis of data of central concern to senior management teams (Morphew et al op cit; 
Hazelkorn 2015: 110) and affects internal  resource allocation (Kim 2017).  
Evidence relating domestic rankings to student behaviour suggests differences by 
institutional type. Sauder and Lancaster (2006) examined the impact of the US News and World 
Report (UNSWR) annual law school rankings. Their analysis, using numerical rankings for top 
schools and a breakdown into four tiers overall, showed  that, among higher-ranked schools, the 
number of applicants increased by a small but significant amount for every one-place increase in 
rank. They also note that tier membership changes rarely. Luca and Smith (2013) report similar 
results for ‘top 25’ and ‘top 50’ USNWR institutions. In the UK, Gibbons et al (2015) 
investigated the impact on applications of published ‘National Student Survey’ rankings. They 
find that changes have small, though statistically significant, effects on application rates,  
concentrated among more highly qualified students and heavily oversubscribed institutions.  
Conversely, among American “Historically Black Colleges and Universities”, which typically 
have quite low academic entry standards, domestic rankings appear to have no significant effect 
on admissions (Jones 2016).    
In contrast, Hazelkorn found that an overwhelming majority of international  students use 
rankings to inform decisions with high-achieving and affluent students especially likely to use 
them. (Hazelkorn 2015 passim). Bastedo and Bowman (2010) looked at the impact of domestic 
rankings on financial outcomes, using a sample of 225 US universities that appear in the 
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composite U.S. News rankings. They analyse tuition and fees for in-state and out-of-state 
students separately, since the latter are routinely set at much higher levels. Domestic (US) 
rankings had a significant effect on out-of-state income 2 or 4 years later, but not on in-state. 
This is consistent with our suggestion that composite rankings may be especially important 
when recruitment is over a wide area.  
In international rankings, research indicators and citations dominate outcomes (Kaycheng 
2015).  This makes research reputation critical to creating a virtuous circle in which more 
research funding generates good research outcomes, and enhances desirability further. 
(Morphew, Fumasoli and Stensaker 2017). If reputational winners also derive direct financial 
benefits through an ability to charge higher fees, or attract more students, this makes sustained 
research excellence more affordable and can explain the observed stability of US rankings  
(Fowles 2016, Sauder and Lancaster op cit). 
The vice-chancellor of New Zealand’s top-ranked university considers it self-evident that 
‘of course…income per student …is correlated with international rankings’ (McCutcheon 
2017).                                                   We hypothesise that he is correct and indeed that the 
impact of reputation on institutions’ teaching income will be large and clearly observable. We 
study this question across an entire national system, for what we believe to be the first time, 
using comprehensive data from England. We focus on teaching income, made up of both fees 
and recurrent payments for teaching from government: teaching income is a clearly identified 
income stream in our data set. We make use of a number of reputational variables, and so can 
also address the question of whether international rankings are as important as many observers 
believe.   
 
Higher education in contemporary England 
The English university sector is well suited to this research.  First, comprehensive income 
and administrative data are available from the early 2000s. Second, the sector is sizeable, 
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making it feasible to estimate the quantitative impact of different variables. Third, as discussed 
below, student fees make up a very large part of teaching income, and universities have 
considerable freedom to set their own fee levels for some (though not all) courses. In principle, 
therefore, teaching income per student may vary considerably. Not all these features are shared 
across the increasingly devolved UK: Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have developed 
quite distinct funding regimes. Indeed simply being a university in England, rather than 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, now has a highly significant positive effect on teaching-
income per student (Jenkins and Wolf 2016).  Our analysis therefore concentrates on England.   
Teaching income Universities in England receive money for teaching purposes from a 
combination of sources. For home undergraduates (which includes all who are EU domiciled), 
degree study remained free at the point of use until the late 1990s (Aldrich 2002). Governments 
paid fees and teaching grants, at levels related to subject of study, and controlled the number of 
students per university. In the 1990s, rapid expansion was secured by reducing spending per 
home student, and quality declined (Palfreyman and Tapper 2014).  Fees paid directly by the 
students were therefore introduced by the 1997 Labour government, albeit initially at a very low 
level, with the bulk of undergraduate teaching income continuing to come from the government.  
From 2006, a system of higher fees was implemented, alongside some continuing government 
payments for teaching, notably for high-cost science, engineering and technology subjects.  
Home (EU) students can borrow their fee payments through the government’s Student Loans 
Company and then repay, as and when they earn enough.  The government sets maximum levels 
(fee caps) for undergraduate home students, and universities could in principle charge less than 
the cap. However, there is little incentive to do so (Wolf 2016) and home undergraduate fees are 
effectively uniform for English universities. 
This is not true for any other group of fees. Postgraduate fees for home students have been 
progressively deregulated, and are mostly set by individual institutions. Moreover, universities 
have, since the early 1980s, been able to recruit as many ‘international’ (non EU) students as 
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they wish at all levels (subject to the students’ academic competence), and also decide what to 
charge them. This has led to a rapid increase in international students and international fee 
income.  By 2007-8, 16% of overall teaching and tuition revenue in England derived from 
international (non-EU) students (Dearden et al 2012). By 2013/14 this had risen to 24%. 
(HESA )  
The analyses reported here focus on teaching income per student in the period up to and 
including 2013-14 because, immediately afterwards, further major changes were made whose 
disruptive effects are not yet clear.  Total home student numbers were traditionally tightly 
controlled at institutional level.  These caps were, quite unexpectedly, abolished in 2014. In the 
short period since, there have been major swings in home recruitment, with some universities 
expanding very fast and others shrinking. To obtain quantitative estimates of reputational impact 
on income, we needed to study a period of relative stability where we could identify and control 
for other variables, and 2013-14 marks the end of such a period. 
Sector characteristics  England’s higher education sector is very homogeneous in its 
institutional structure (Moodie 2015). Almost all institutions are universities which grant all 
levels of degree (bachelors, masters, doctoral) and are subject to the same funding and 
regulatory regimes including intensive periodic reviews by government of research quality. The 
results of these reviews are public, and are important in establishing the research reputation of 
institutions and individual faculties. This organisational homogeneity is relatively recent. It 
follows from the 1992 decision to transform all polytechnics into universities; and the 
progressive transformation, thereafter, of other existing higher education institutions into 
universities with full degree-awarding powers.  
English higher education is also, in reputational terms, extremely heterogeneous. This has 
been true for many decades but the institutional changes described above have further increased 
heterogeneity on variables associated with reputation and prestige.  (Palfreyman op cit). England 
is second only to the United States in the number of its universities which rank high in global 
	 9	
tables; but has many which do not appear by name in any rankings. This combination of 
organisational homogeneity and reputational heterogeneity is important in making this analysis 
possible. 
Sample, variables and method 
The study focuses on (a) generalist universities which (b) faced the same strategic 
opportunities and limitations as the large majority of the sector during the period 2007-14.  To 
create the sample we determined that institutions should be eligible for Student Loans Company 
funding; not exclusively postgraduate; and sizeable  - so having at least 1,000 undergraduates, at 
least 75% of them doing full degrees, and at least 60% studying full-time.  These criteria 
excluded a few unusual institutions (eg the Open University, which educates part-time distance 
learners). We excluded specialist institutions (eg conservatoires) which do not meet the criteria 
for inclusion in established ranking exercises (national and/or global). 97 English universities 
met the criteria for inclusion and are listed in Table A1, along with their university ‘type’ or 
mission group. However, one university, Buckingham, is a private university which does not 
belong to any of the groups, and since most of our models include group membership as a 
variable, it is excluded, leaving a maximum sample of 96 for analysis. Institutional size varies 
enormously within this group, and teaching income-per-student, not total teaching income, is 
therefore the preferable outcome measure.   
 
Teaching income per student varies markedly among English universities and has done for 
a good number of years. This is shown in Figure 1, for both 2007-8 and 2013-14. 2007-8 was 
chosen as a comparator because it was just before publication of the results of research quality 
review carried out by the UK government. These reviews, as noted above,  occur only 
periodically, may affect reputation, but have no direct impact on teaching income.  The 2008 
results (from the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)) were not superseded until after the 
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2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF) review: another reason for using 2013-14 as a cut-
off.  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE]  
 
Explanatory variables 
 
While the focus of the study is the impact of reputation on teaching income, it was 
important also to identify, and control for, other factors. We hypothesise that the following  non-
reputational characteristics of a university might affect levels of teaching income per student: 
Academic composition of the student body. Significant financial support is still received 
directly from government for high-cost degrees, so the proportion of such degrees will affect 
teaching income per student. 
Internationalisation of the student body   The average level of teaching income received 
per non-EU student is well above the average teaching income per EU (home) student. (Dearden 
et al 2012: 85)  Institutions that have higher proportions of international students may therefore 
have higher per-student teaching income. 
Location  Some locations may be more or less attractive to high-fee students because of 
housing or labour market factors. 
Rate of growth of the university. Institutions with high overall levels of demand may opt to 
increase overall size as a way of increasing the proportion of high-fee students in popular 
courses without having to close less popular ones.  
Size Larger institutions (with larger enrolments) may find it easier to respond quickly and 
effectively to changes in student demand and government policy. 
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Undergraduate/postgraduate mix  England’s home undergraduate fees are highly 
regulated, but most postgraduate fees are not. Institutions which have made a strategic decision 
to increase the proportion of postgraduates may have higher per-student teaching income.  
In addition, a number of actual or potential reputational variables can be identified. 
Global reputation rankings A number of global league tables have become highly 
important in framing university behaviours, as discussed above. One of the best-known is the 
Times Higher Education (THE). It uses a wider set of criteria than the Jiao Tong or QS rankings 
(also frequently cited), and is used for the analyses. 
UK-specific league tables In the UK the best known is from The Guardian newspaper. It 
weighs non-research indicators heavily and its rankings diverge from those of research-heavy 
league tables.   
University type or brand Reputation may be affected by the ‘brand’ of the national system 
overall or by the within-nation category to which an institution belongs.  As discussed above, 
one response to the reputational heterogeneity of British universities has been the formation of 
mission groups, with  24 of the large research-intensive universities organised as the ‘Russell 
Group’. In addition, a distinction is often drawn, within and outside the sector,  between ‘pre-
92’ and  ‘new’ or ‘post-92’ universities. This does not relate to the overall age of an institution, 
but to when it became a full university: and 1992 was when a large number of polytechnics all 
became full universities at the same time. Figure 2 shows almost no overlap at all between 
Russell Group and post-92 institutions in teaching income per-student, although of course, this 
is not necessarily a direct result of group membership, but indicates how wide differences now 
are. Figure 2 also shows the strong growth in teaching income per head enjoyed by the English 
university system overall during the period under study, driven by increased home 
undergraduate fees, and rising international enrolments .  
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
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Government research rankings The UK government, as already noted.  operates a system 
of periodic research quality assessments, whose results are widely disseminated. Rankings are 
subject-specific, and so allow individual faculties or small specialised institutions to obtain a 
high overall rank. They are also likely to be strongly associated with league table rankings 
(Keycheng op cit).  
Measures of student satisfaction   The English government has since 2004 run a National 
Student Survey which asks final-year undergraduate students to rate their experiences. The 
results are publicly available. 
 
Data 
Income data were obtained via HEIDI, the Higher Education Information Database for 
Institutions, which is the web-based management information service for the UK’s Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA). Teaching income per student was constructed by dividing 
teaching income by the number of FTE students in the same year. 
As for explanatory predictors, a number of derived variables were created including the 
proportion of non-EU international students and of postgraduate students in total FTE student 
numbers, and growth of overall student numbers, undergraduate numbers and postgraduate 
numbers from 2007 to 2014. Another variable measured the proportion of students on high cost 
‘STEM-related’ (i.e. Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) which attract 
additional teaching grants.   Binary variables were created for the presence of a medical school, 
and for whether the university is in the Greater London area. A categorical variable 
distinguished between Russell Group, other pre-92 universities, and post-92 universities. On 
research, we used results of the government’s 2008 ‘Research Assessment Exercise’ (RAE) 
aggregated to university level, with a ranking based on grade-point average. From the National 
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Student Survey (NSS) we used the percentage who 'definitely' or 'mostly' agreed that 'Overall, I 
am satisfied with the quality of my course'. 
 
 
Method 
The method used in this paper is multiple linear regression analysis.  This enables the 
researcher to control for a range of variables when examining the key relationship of interest: in 
this case, between measures of reputation and teaching income. Descriptive statistics and 
bivariate correlations were used to explore the relationships between the variables in our dataset 
and make informed decisions on whether or not to retain all variables.  This confirmed the 
strong relationship between most reputational indicators and teaching income (the exception 
being the NSS: r=0.39).  
 An assumption underlying basic forms of linear regression analysis is that the variance of 
the residuals is constant across all observation points.  However, our data display signs of being 
heteroskedastic – there is increasing variance with a number of the explanatory variables as 
Figure 3 illustrates.  We have therefore adopted the widely used technique for  estimating robust 
standard errors that does not require a constant variance assumption (Kaufman 2013).  This 
typically yields larger standard errors, and so makes it less likely that statistically significant 
results will be obtained than under standard linear regression assumptions.   
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
The regression analysis started with models containing few explanatory variables, and 
added further variables in stages.  The modelling process was sequential, dropping variables 
which were not statistically significant at each stage. A number of different approaches were 
used. The first set of models looked at how far a number of explanatory variables are able to 
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predict teaching income per student. The second set took growth in teaching income per student 
as the outcome variable. If successful institutions enter a ‘virtuous circle’, in which outputs and 
reputation are self-reinforcing, then over time (ceteris paribus) they are likely to exhibit faster 
growth and not just higher levels of teaching income per student. Finally, a more explicitly 
longitudinal approach, utilising panel regression techniques was used to examine directly 
whether changes in reputational variables were associated with changes in teaching income. The 
results of all three approaches are reported in the next section, although it should be emphasised 
that, because of data limitations, the results of the second and third approaches must be treated 
with caution.  
 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports a first set of regression results. These examine the predictive power of a 
number of ‘domestic’ variables, using two UK-specific reputational variables, combined with 
measures of student mix and subject mix. Models 1 and 2 explore the predictive power of the 
reputational variables, and models 3, 4 and 5 examine how far this is reduced (and may 
therefore be accounted for) by other institutional characteristics.  
Table 1 here 
The reputational variables are how highly ranked the university was in the 2008 
government research ratings (‘RAE rank’), and university type, where the reference category is 
‘other pre-92’ universities, i.e. those older institutions which are not in the Russell Group. 
Neither is directly linked to teaching income in any way: any effect must therefore be through 
fee levels. Three universities have no RAE data and are omitted from these analyses.  Model 1 
shows a strong relationship between RAE ranking and teaching income per student: note that the 
top rank is 1, so this appears as a negative number. Moving from, for example, 5th to 4th, or 
from 26th to 25th place is associated with a £36 rise, and being in the top third rather than the 
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bottom third of the overall RAE rankings is associated with about a £3,000 rise in teaching 
income per student .   In model 2, being a Russell Group university is associated with almost 
£1700 extra teaching income per-student compared to other ‘old’ universities (equivalent to 
rising over 40 places when RAE alone was used.)  [1] The R2 in the model 2 regression is 0.65, 
suggesting that 65% of the variation can be accounted for using just two reputational factors.   
The remaining models in Table 1 add London location, university size, the proportion of 
STEM students (because home undergraduates in these subjects attract higher average teaching 
income) and the proportion of international (non-EU) students to the regression analysis.  The 
proportion of international students was highly significant (p < 0.001) as expected but in the full 
model (model 5) proportion of STEM students is significant only at the 5% level . Being in 
London was strongly and positively associated with teaching income per student even after 
controlling for other factors. Other things equal, universities in London had over £800 per 
student more teaching income after allowing for other variables in the regression model.  The 
size of the university was significantly associated with teaching income per student although the 
predicted substantive impact was small to moderate. Having a medical school, and university 
growth, were dropped at this point as non-significant. [2] 
As other variables were introduced, the effect size of the research reputation (RAE) 
variable became progressively smaller and in Models 4 and 5 it is no longer statistically 
significant.  That is, one can no longer reject the null hypothesis of no association between 
teaching income per student in 2013/14 and RAE 2008 ranking. Being a member of the 
research-intensive Russell Group, however, remains extremely important.  
Table 2  again focuses on domestic variables: National Student Survey scores and the 
Guardian newspaper’s UK-only league table (which emphasises non-research variables.)  Four 
universities lack Guardian rankings and are omitted. Each of these reputational variables was 
significantly associated with teaching income per student when no controls were used (models 1 
and 3), although the effect sizes were small. However, both are insignificant once we control for 
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other factors which may influence teaching income per student. Being a research-intensive 
Russell Group member and being in London again have a very large effect. R2  for the final 
model here is almost exactly the same as in the final model in Table 1 (R2 = 0.853): in other 
words, adding in the NSS or Guardian scores does not increase explanatory power.  
Table 2 here 
Table 3 shows the association between global rankings and teaching income per student, 
using THE world rankings. These rankings, though very well known,  impose some serious 
limitations on the analysis. Over the 2007-14 analysis period, they give an individual rank only 
to the top 200 institutions, with other listed institutions being placed in groups or tiers. [3]  26 
English institutions appear in the top 200. This is an extremely small sample although analysis 
results for this sub-group (using a scale variable for individual rank)  are consistent with, while 
predictably weaker, than for the whole sample. Table 3 therefore uses category variables for 
rankings and includes the full data set.  
Table 3 here 
In the absence of any other explanatory variables, being an English university in the top 
50 of the THE rankings is associated with approximately £5,700 extra teaching income per 
student.  Being ranked between 51 and 200 is also significant and worth nearly £2,200 per 
student.  Adding further explanatory variables reduces the effect size and significance of the 
international ranking variable but it remains large  - £2,700 per student- for those in the top 50. 
University type also continues, in these models, to be associated with teaching income levels, 
Overall, R2 is high (=0.896). 
Overall, some but not all reputational variables appear very strongly related to teaching 
income. Global rankings and Russell Group membership, both highly research-related, appear to 
have the strongest influence, and are highly correlated: virtually all Russell Group universities 
are in the THE top 200. [4]  Other domestic rankings do not appear to be important.  
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While consistent with the hypothesis that reputation translates into income, these are 
cross-sectional results. They do not examine whether gaps tend to widen over time between 
higher and lower reputation institutions, or whether changes in reputation have an impact (as 
will occur if the link is direct). Further analyses therefore looked at growth in teaching income 
per student between 2007/8 and 2013/14.  
Table 4 here 
Table 4 uses a number of explanatory variables that were statistically significant in models 
reported above. Only 25 institutions had individual ranks in the THE rankings across the period, 
and, not surprisingly, there were generally no significant results for this very small sample. 
Table 4  provides results for the full sample and employs a variable that (using the same 
categories as in Table 3) records whether or not there was a change in a university’s THE 
category (tier). Results must be interpreted with caution, because there were major changes to 
the ranking system after 2009 so that the end of the period is not strictly comparable to the start. 
Moreover, only a few universities changed category (as one might predict if reputation tends to 
be self-reinforcing). Nonetheless, the results indicate that upward change for an institution is 
positively related to teaching income growth. So is university type, with new universities 
showing significantly less growth. 
As noted above, pooling several years of data and applying panel regression techniques  
allows one to examine changes over time (an approach used by, for example, Sauder and 
Lancaster op cit).  An advantage of these techniques is that we can include fixed effects for 
institution, and so control for effects that are unobserved  (Allison  2009). The disadvantage is 
that, in panel models, change in the variables is required in order to provide estimates – any 
variables which do not change over time will drop out. In the key case of global rankings, data 
limitations are serious: we can only obtain estimates if institutions change their ‘value’ on this 
variable and only a very small number of universities have individual integer ranking. Using 
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categorical rankings, to overcome sample size issues means very little change, because , as 
already noted, few move categories in any one year or even over the whole period. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Table 5  shows results  for 2007-14. This was, as shown above, a period of rapid though 
uneven increase in teaching income across the sector (as indicated by the year dummies). These 
analyses use five categories for the Times Higher ranking which can be applied across the 
period: the top 200 are split into groups of 50 and the fifth is any outside the top 200. This has 
the advantage of being a little closer to the integer rankings we would ideally like to use but the 
disadvantage of having rather smaller numbers within each of the top four categories, plus a 
large number of cases who are simply ‘outside the top 200’.  Nonetheless, we obtain quite large 
effect sizes for the post 2009 years.  For example, the effect of being ranked in the top 50, 
according to model (2), Table 5,  is about £850 [= £48.43 + £800.86] extra income per student.  
However, there is no statistically significant effect of being in the top 50 in the years prior to 
2010 (note the interaction term is coded 0 for 2009 and earlier), while some of the other 
rankings are significantly negative for this pre-2010 period.  The crude interaction term is, 
arguably, doing something to capture the effects of the structural break in the time series when 
THE ranking criteria changed in 2010.  
Overall, these different approaches all indicate that some reputational variables are 
positively associated with English universities’ teaching income per student , as hypothesised, 
and that their impact on teaching income is substantial. The measures which are consistently 
significant are those which are generic, easily available and easily understood, including to 
international markets:  global THE rankings appear to be especially important, in contrast to 
domestic reputational measures. The power of some reputational variables to predict differences 
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in average teaching income per student dwarfs that of other factors such as subject mix, or 
proportion of overseas students.  
 
Conclusion 
These results provide, for the first time, clear evidence of how very well reputation may 
‘pay’, in the context of a globalised and marketised university system. They also provide 
insights into the central importance of research. Global rankings are overwhelmingly based on 
research, while the ‘Russell Group’ brand is also largely research-based. Hence, universities 
with strong research are well placed to earn significantly higher teaching incomes, attract good 
faculty and students, and produce good outcomes (both research and teaching-related) which 
reinforce their reputation. The system thus tends to produce a very stable status hierarchy at 
global level, and in the rankings which have the most statistical significance in our analyses of 
teaching income. Domestic rankings which use multiple indicators have no such impact.    
These findings are consistent with the fact that, in contemporary England, the fees which 
can vary between universities are mostly those paid by international students. Domestic 
reputational measures may affect home students’ choices, but English undergraduate fees are 
effectively uniform across institutions. Future research might usefully examine whether 
domestic measures have more impact in countries with a more comprehensively deregulated 
sector. The current study was also unable to look at the value of a national brand. It is possible 
that all English universities benefit (and might in future suffer) from the national system’s 
reputation overseas: again, this might usefully be studied.   
While the results reported here reflect some England-specific circumstances, they also 
confirm that a global dynamic is giving both league tables and ‘brand’ enormous importance. 
We may conclude that universities are extremely unlikely to change their preoccupation with 
research excellence, at least in the short term: and that, as long as higher education remains an 
international enterprise, global ‘winners’ are likely both to retain their position and increase 
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their wealth. Governments concerned to promote greater equality within the higher education 
sector, or to reduce the importance given to research, need to be aware that system dynamics are 
taking universities in the opposite direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
End notes 
1. See Jenkins and Wolf 2016 for full specification of this model  
2. In other regressions not reported here, the presence of a medical school was not statistically 
significant in any models. We explored several growth variables, but none of them were 
statistically significant in models which controlled for other factors.  
3. The	rankings	have	changed	over	time	and	now	(2017)	include	more	institutions.	4.	22 of the 24 Russell Group universities were in the top 200 in THE world rankings in 
2012/13; all of them were in this top 200 in 2015/16.    
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Figure 1: Teaching income (recurrent + fees) per FTE student 2013/14, English universities 
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Figure 2: Real teaching income per student, 2007/08 to 2013/14, by sector. English universities.  
£, 2014 prices. 
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Figure 3: Teaching income per student and size of university (FTE students) 
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Table 1: Regression models for teaching income per student, including UK-specific reputational indicators	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RAE ranking (2008) -35.533*** -14.618** -9.239* -3.265 -1.042 
 (-8.41) (-3.26) (-2.27) (-0.65) (-0.22) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group university  1685.261*** 1817.316***  1603.159*** 
  (3.42) (4.15)  (5.06) 
      
New university  -796.568* -966.214**  340.962 
  (-2.37) (-3.02)  (0.81) 
      
London   1282.076*** 870.097** 820.363** 
   (3.51) (2.96) (3.38) 
      
Percentage STEM     108.600** 76.815* 
    (3.16) (2.52) 
      
Proportion international     107.942*** 107.349*** 
    (5.01) (5.84) 
      
University size    -0.017 -0.043* 
    (-1.12) (-2.49) 
      
Constant 11425.520*** 10142.984*** 9609.724*** 7143.178*** 7068.833*** 
 (30.22) (30.71) (33.41) (10.61) (13.34) 
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 
R2 0.560 0.650 0.721 0.794 0.852 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2: Further regression models for teaching income per student, including further UK-specific reputational indicators	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NSS score 131.330*** -45.637   
 (3.49) (-1.92)   
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group university  1684.077***  1546.818*** 
  (5.36)  (4.95) 
     
New university  171.351  447.224 
  (0.52)  (1.26) 
     
Percentage STEM   83.434**  56.043 
  (2.79)  (1.69) 
     
Proportion international 
(non-EU) students 
 114.867***  97.087*** 
  (7.58)  (5.23) 
     
London  682.205**  978.525*** 
  (2.98)  (4.20) 
     
University size  -0.053***  -0.039* 
  (-3.79)  (-2.47) 
     
Guardian score 2012/13   97.861*** 21.611 
   (8.17) (1.72) 
     
Constant -1753.359 10921.015*** 3550.603*** 5931.387*** 
 (-0.56) (5.22) (5.61) (8.77) 
Observations 96 96 92 92 
R2 0.135 0.852 0.556 0.853 
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t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Further regression models for teaching income per student, including global reputational indicators	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ranking (reference outside top 200, incl unranked) 
Ranked in top 50 5683.351*** 4340.242*** 2946.416*** 3520.688*** 2669.009*** 
 (8.18) (5.19) (4.44) (7.93) (4.56) 
      
Ranked in top 200 (but outside top 50) 2162.338*** 930.222* 478.456 1070.228*** 487.642 
 (9.39) (2.38) (1.42) (4.42) (1.31) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group university  369.975 582.557  868.767* 
  (1.08) (1.93)  (2.27) 
      
Post-92 university  -1216.417*** -131.446  41.032 
  (-3.62) (-0.45)  (0.13) 
      
Proportion international    104.148*** 90.816*** 94.319*** 
   (5.85) (6.91) (6.06) 
      
Percentage STEM     26.845 29.157 
    (1.40) (1.39) 
      
London    732.499** 706.824*** 
    (3.31) (3.47) 
	 30	
      
University size    -0.026* -0.036** 
    (-2.40) (-3.13) 
      
Constant 8312.637*** 9285.770*** 7320.382*** 7460.157*** 7516.592*** 
 (68.35) (29.16) (20.53) (42.17) (21.31) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.689 0.742 0.863 0.888 0.896 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Growth in real teaching income per student, 2007/08 to 2013/14	
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Change in ranking group 
2007/08 to 2011/12 (+ve 
= improved ranking) 
1.3430 3.6661 4.7557* 4.2804* 4.2131* 
 (0.50) (1.93) (2.58) (1.99) (2.27) 
      
Russell Group university  2.6041 -0.6208  -3.3719 
  (1.01) (-0.22)  (-1.11) 
      
New university  -9.1224*** -10.0191***  -7.3990* 
  (-3.82) (-4.27)  (-2.28) 
      
University size   0.0005** 0.0003 0.0004* 
   (2.80) (1.84) (2.39) 
      
Percent STEM    5.9082** 3.9396 
    (3.38) (1.67) 
      
Percent non-EU     0.1572 0.0066 
    (1.14) (0.04) 
      
Constant 16.7117*** 21.5873*** 16.0338*** 6.0731* 12.7570** 
 (14.50) (11.35) (6.05) (2.43) (3.04) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.002 0.223 0.293 0.271 0.314 
t statistics in parentheses 
• p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00 
• Table 5: Fixed effects regression for real teaching income per student, 2007/08 to 2013/14 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
THE ranking (base: not in top 200)     
THE ranking: top 50  -55.09 48.43 103.70 127.54 101.18 
 (-0.25) (0.32) (0.69) (0.84) (0.72) 
THE ranking : 51 to 100  -247.22 -177.95 -176.73 -159.09 -191.31 
 (-1.64) (-1.68) (-1.69) (-1.50) (-1.96) 
THE ranking: 101 to 150 -491.27** -328.69** -261.31* -231.52* -134.15 
 (-3.26) (-3.09) (-2.45) (-2.10) (-1.32) 
THE ranking: 151 to 200 -208.85 -241.53* -197.78* -178.96 -103.24 
 (-1.50) (-2.46) (-2.03) (-1.81) (-1.13) 
      
Interaction: top 50 ranking /post 
2009 
922.38*** 800.86*** 748.86*** 720.89*** 766.42*** 
 (8.00) (9.58) (8.95) (8.24) (9.49) 
Interaction: ranking 51 to 100 /post 
2009 
488.53** 475.81*** 463.53*** 452.88*** 495.82*** 
 (3.29) (4.46) (4.39) (4.27) (5.07) 
Interaction: ranking 101 to 150 
/post 2009 
762.48*** 546.71*** 419.66*** 384.37*** 288.19** 
 (5.69) (5.63) (4.14) (3.61) (2.92) 
Interaction: ranking 151 to 200 
/post 2009 
608.16*** 531.44*** 412.01*** 385.84*** 317.66*** 
 (4.64) (5.60) (4.17) (3.80) (3.38) 
Year dummies (base, 2007)      
2008  489.24*** 478.58*** 475.47*** 514.84*** 
  (13.51) (13.34) (13.22) (15.42) 
2009  435.79*** 410.74*** 404.27*** 516.75*** 
  (12.02) (11.29) (10.97) (14.44) 
2010  261.73*** 240.16*** 234.45*** 335.44*** 
  (6.87) (6.31) (6.11) (9.12) 
2011  127.65*** 107.64** 98.86* 231.17*** 
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  (3.35) (2.83) (2.54) (6.05) 
2012  451.62*** 422.22*** 414.14*** 467.24*** 
  (11.83) (10.97) (10.57) (12.80) 
2013  782.62*** 739.80*** 729.40*** 751.70*** 
  (20.53) (18.84) (18.06) (20.15) 
      
Percent Non-EU    21.01*** 19.98*** 43.91*** 
   (3.86) (3.62) (7.80) 
      
Percent STEM    94.54 267.29** 
    (1.10) (3.28) 
      
University size     -0.13*** 
     (-10.01) 
      
Constant 6022.99*** 5656.14*** 5413.91*** 5345.07*** 6651.12*** 
 (173.52) (161.71) (75.54) (56.08) (42.27) 
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 
Number of universities 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 between 0.482 0.498 0.781 0.777 0.223 
R2 within 0.219 0.625 0.634 0.635 0.690 
R2 overall 0.226 0.226 0.531 0.591 0.260 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table	1A		List	of	universities	included	in	the	analysis	
Count Institution type location 
1 The University of Bristol Russell Group England 
2 The University of Nottingham Russell Group England 
3 The University of Oxford Russell Group England 
4 The University of Durham Russell Group England 
5 The University of Leeds Russell Group England 
6 
University of Newcastle-upon-
Tyne Russell Group England 
7 Queen Mary University of London Russell Group England 
8 The University of Cambridge Russell Group England 
9 LSE (London School of Economics) Russell Group England 
10 The University of Southampton Russell Group England 
11 King's College London Russell Group England 
12 University of Manchester Russell Group England 
13 Imperial College Russell Group England 
14 The University of Sheffield Russell Group England 
15 The University of Liverpool Russell Group England 
16 The University of Exeter Russell Group England 
17 The University of Birmingham Russell Group England 
18 The University of York Russell Group England 
19 University of Warwick Russell Group England 
20 University College London Russell Group England 
21 The University of Sussex Other pre-92 England 
22 The University of Salford Other pre-92 England 
23 SOAS Other pre-92 England 
24 Royal Holloway Other pre-92 England 
	 36	
25 The University of Essex Other pre-92 England 
26 The University of Bradford Other pre-92 England 
27 The University of Bath Other pre-92 England 
28 Goldsmiths College Other pre-92 England 
29 The University of East Anglia Other pre-92 England 
30 The University of Reading Other pre-92 England 
31 The University of Hull Other pre-92 England 
32 The University of Leicester Other pre-92 England 
33 The University of Lancaster Other pre-92 England 
34 Aston University Other pre-92 England 
35 The University of Surrey Other pre-92 England 
36 The University of Kent Other pre-92 England 
37 Loughborough University Other pre-92 England 
38 The City University Other pre-92 England 
39 Brunel University London Other pre-92 England 
40 The University of Keele Other pre-92 England 
41 Oxford Brookes University Former polytechnic England 
42 Manchester Met Former polytechnic England 
43 Birmingham City University Former polytechnic England 
44 Coventry University Former polytechnic England 
45 Teesside University Former polytechnic England 
46 The University of Portsmouth Former polytechnic England 
47 The University of Sunderland Former polytechnic England 
48 The University of West London Former polytechnic England 
49 UWE Former polytechnic England 
50 The University of East London Former polytechnic England 
51 Sheffield Hallam University Former polytechnic England 
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52 The University of Lincoln Former polytechnic England 
53 University of Hertfordshire Former polytechnic England 
54 University of Plymouth Former polytechnic England 
55 The University of Huddersfield Former polytechnic England 
56 The University of Greenwich Former polytechnic England 
57 Bournemouth University Former polytechnic England 
58 Leeds Beckett University Former polytechnic England 
59 London Metropolitan University Former polytechnic England 
60 London South Bank University Former polytechnic England 
61 Staffordshire University Former polytechnic England 
62 
The University of Central 
Lancashire Former polytechnic England 
63 University of Westminster Former polytechnic England 
64 De Montfort University Former polytechnic England 
65 Liverpool John Moores University Former polytechnic England 
66 The Nottingham Trent University Former polytechnic England 
67 University of Northumbria Former polytechnic England 
68 University of Wolverhampton Former polytechnic England 
69 Kingston University Former polytechnic England 
70 The University of Brighton Former polytechnic England 
71 Anglia Ruskin University Former polytechnic England 
72 Middlesex University Former polytechnic England 
73 York St John University Other post-92 England 
74 University of Worcester Other post-92 England 
75 Bishop Grosseteste University Other post-92 England 
76 University of Bedfordshire Other post-92 England 
77 University of Gloucestershire Other post-92 England 
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78 University of Winchester Other post-92 England 
79 The University of Northampton Other post-92 England 
80 Falmouth University Other post-92 England 
81 University for the Creative Arts Other post-92 England 
82 University of Derby Other post-92 England 
83 Buckinghamshire New University Other post-92 England 
84 Southampton Solent University Other post-92 England 
85 Newman University Other post-92 England 
86 Leeds Trinity University Other post-92 England 
87 University of the Arts, London Other post-92 England 
88 
Canterbury Christ Church 
University Other post-92 England 
89 University of Cumbria Other post-92 England 
90 Edge Hill University Other post-92 England 
91 The University of Bolton Other post-92 England 
92 University of Chester Other post-92 England 
93 The University of Chichester Other post-92 England 
94 Bath Spa University Other post-92 England 
95 Roehampton University Other post-92 England 
96 Liverpool Hope University Other post-92 England 
97 The University of Buckingham Private England 
 
